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Do The Fraud Triangle Components Motivate Fraud In Indonesia? 
Abstract 
In present day Indonesia, cases of frauds are rarely covered by the media. Even though some fraud might 
not be material enough to be detected, the motivation for conducting fraud exist, especially when the 
internal systems have some leakage. The fraud triangle and the Beneish model are two well-developed 
theories to understand the motivations for fraud and to detect earnings manipulation in a business. 
Therefore, this empirical research aims to examine the applicability of the fraud triangle components 
combined with the M-score from Beneish model. The investigation involves panel data from 270 non-
financial companies listed on IDX (Indonesia Stock Exchange) during 2013-2015. The results approved 
that companies with detected fraud received (1) higher pressure on financial stability, leverage, and 
financial targets; (2) lower numbers of independent commissioners and more receivables from special 
(related) parties, and (3) more frequent changes to auditors. 
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More ethical business practice is often requested by the public. Ethics should be a 
foundation for doing business to prevent unwanted results and triggering unethical 
behaviour. The absence of ethics in an organization can motivate fraud to occur 
(Adhariani & Siregar, 2018). A deliberate failure to report financial information can be 
in the form of material misinterpretation (Nguyen, 2010), inappropriate income 
recognition and excessive asset recognition (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson & Lapides, 
2000), negligence in the presentation of notes to the financial statement or other reasons 
for avoiding a bad image of the company (Agarwal & Medury, 2014).  
Fraud is dangerous to society and has the main economic impact among other types of 
crimes (Free, 2015). It brings huge losses, which have a significant effect on the capital 
market and lead to degradation of shareholder value, a decline in the value of shares, 
bankruptcy or liquidation, and leads to delisting from the national stock exchange 
(Beasley, Carcello, & Hermanson, 1999). Therefore, fraudulent financial statements 
have become a severe concern for investors and other stakeholders. 
Frauds in financial reporting can be identified with the fraud triangle approach proposed 
by Clinard and Cressey (1954) who suggested that financial fraud is caused by pressure, 
opportunity, and rationalization. A fraud (earnings manipulation) can also be detected 
by the Beneish Model, which was firstly introduced by Messod Beneish in 1999. This 
research links the Beneish model with the fraud triangle theory. Therefore, this study 
examines the applicability of the fraud triangle components combined with the M-score 
with results from the Beneish model. The result of this paper is expected to provide 
practical implications for prospective investors and stakeholders to detect fraud in their 
organization using the combination of both models.   
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Financial reporting fraud is a misstatement or elimination of amounts or disclosures that 
are intentionally carried out to deceive its users. The result of fraudulent financial 
reporting can increase the adverse impact on investors and global economic stability 
(Zhou & Kapoor, 2011). Thus, fraud detection of financial statements is essential due to 
devastating consequences. 
 
Fraud is often subtle at first, and increases if not detected. Thus, fraud detection plays 
an important role in assessing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting quickly and 
adequately (Srivastava, Mock, & Turner, 2009). An approach that can be used for fraud 
detection is with the triangle fraud model. This model explains how one commits a 
fraud motivated by three components, namely pressure, opportunity and rationalization 
(Clinard & Cressey, 1954). This model is constructed on the premise that cheating is a 
result of a combination of these three components.  
 
To commit fraud, someone might be in financial stress or other types of pressure. Being 
under pressure will increase the likelihood of committing fraud (Suyanto, 2009; 
Aidafitri & Arta, 2014). Some examples of pressures are financial needs, the need to 
perform better, work frustration, or company’s target. Fraud can also happen because of 
the fraud-risk corporate cultures like bullying and top management greed. These 
Aida Fitri, Syukur & Justisa | Do the Fraud Triangle Components Motivate Fraud in Indonesia?  
 
65 
cultures can be tackled down by increasing working ethos, encouraging proper 
behaviour, and well-tailored internal control (Schuchter & Levi, 2016). 
A pressure is claimed as a trigger factor of fraud that can direct the perpetrators to do 
the unethical behaviour (Ruankaew, 2013). Skousen et al. (2008) state that economic 
motives, either incentives or punishment, always appear in companies that commit 
fraud, such as profit target, growth maintenance, bonus deductions, poor performance 
evaluations, or even dismissal. These pressures invite a person to manipulate financial 
statements to make them look better than reality. Huang, Lin, Chiu, & Yen, 2017) found 
that pressure is the strongest trigger among the three factors. 
Fraud happens more often in companies with weak internal control systems (Manurung 
& Hadian, 2013), poor security on properties, or unclear policies related to acceptable 
behaviour. These situations provide opportunities to take adverse action for insiders as 
they know the loopholes in the company. The perpetrator believes the weak internal 
control cannot catch them. Therefore, a well-built internal control system is needed to 
lower the opportunity for someone to commit fraud. Thus, fraud occurs because the 
actor has the opportunity to believe that his action will remain unnoticeable. 
Rationalization is an attitude or character of someone who justifies fraudulent practices 
(Skousen et al., 2008). A perpetrator makes excuses as justification for their actions. For 
example, they rationalize that they only borrow the company’s money, or no one was 
harmed by the action (Singleton & Singleton, 2011). Research related to the fraud 
detection on financial report had been done with the concept of fraud triangle (Amara, 
Ben Amar, & Jarboui, 2013; Lou & Wang, 2009; Skousen et al., 2008), financial ratios 
(Dalnial, Kamaluddin, Sanusi, & Khairuddin, 2014; Persons, 1995), as well as by 
linking earnings management with financial report fraud (Perols & Lougee, 2011). 
There are contradictory results in detecting fraudulent financial statements with triangle 
fraud factors. Lou and Wang (2009) found that the three elements of the fraud triangle 
affect fraudulent financial statements. However, Suyanto (2009), Aghghaleh, Iskandar, 
and Mohamed  (2014), and Diany and Ratmono (2014) found that financial reporting 
fraud was positively correlated with pressure and opportunity factors, but rationalization 
factors were considered difficult to test. Another contradictory result is also found in the 
study of Rachmawati & Marsono (2014), which proves the fraud is influenced by 
opportunity and rationalization factors but not by the pressure factor. 
Someone with deficient moral codes justifies illegal behaviours as acceptable (Lokanan, 
2015). Perpetrators of fraud will seek various defensive mechanisms such as “no one is 
hurt” or “this is for the sake of our company”. The research results of Chen & Elder 
(2007), Rachmawati & Marsono (2014), and Aidafitri & Arta (2014) proved that the 
existence of rationalization affects the occurrence of fraud in financial statements.  
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3. Research Methodology 
3.1 Population and Samples 
A population is the entire study object that consists of a number of individuals, either 
limited or unlimited (Sumarni & Wahyuni, 2008:69). The population in this study is 381 
non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). This study 
employs the purposive sampling method under some criteria that can be seen in Table 
3.1. 
 




1. non-financial companies consecutively listed on the IDX during 2013-2015 381 
2. Companies that cannot access the annual report data and audited financial 
statements in full successively on the IDX in 2013-2015 
(25) 
3. Companies that do not present financial statements in the form of rupiah (54) 
4. Companies whose financial statements do not provide complete data (32) 
Number of samples per year 270 
Number of observations (270 x 3 years) 810 
 
Based on the results of the selection, there were 270 companies that met the criteria as 
research samples. The number of observations of this study for three years was 810 
observations. 
 
3.2 Data Collection Techniques 
The secondary data is taken from the company's annual financial statements from 2013-
2015. Secondary data is data obtained by researchers indirectly through intermediary 
media, which is the official website of the Indonesia Stock Exchange (www.idx.co.id). 
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Exchange in 2013-2015. To collect the data, documentation method is employed by 
studying, researching, and analyzing the company's financial statements.  
 
3.3 Variable Measurement and Operationalization 
3.3.1 The Beneish’s M-score 
 
To find out the companies that commit and do not commit fraud in financial statements 
are measured by the M-score of Beneish Model for earnings manipulation detection 
(Beneish, 1999). A company is deemed to commit frauds if the value of M is greater 
than -2.22. If fraud is indicated, a company is given “1”, and it is given “0” if the 
company does not commit financial statement frauds. Later, these categories are 





With DSRI = Days’ Sales in Receivables Index (ratio of days’ sales in receivables versus prior year as an 
indicator of revenue inflation), GMI = Gross Margin Index (ratio of gross margin versus prior year), 
AQI = Asset Quality Index (ratio of non-current assets other than plant, property and equipment to total 
assets, versus the prior year), SGI = Sales Growth Index (ratio of sales versus prior year), DEPI = 
Depreciation Index (ratio of the rate of depreciation versus prior year), SGAI = Sales, General and 
Administrative expenses Index (ratio of SGA expenses to the prior year), TATA = Total Accruals to Total 
Assets (Total accruals are calculated as the change in working capital accounts other than cashless 
depreciation, LVGI = Leverage Index (ratio of total debt to total assets versus prior year). 
 
Since the introduction in 1999 to date, the Beneish model is practically used by 
academician and business people. It is the most comprehensive way to measure earnings 
manipulation in a company. Many models are better applied in highly complex 
economies, but the Beneish model is reliably applicable in emerging economies as 
proven by Kamal, Salleh, & Ahmad (2016). 
  
3.3.2 The Fraud Triangle 
The fraud triangle consists of pressure, opportunity and rationalization factors that 
motivate criminals to commit fraud. These variables need proxies to make them into 
numbers. Pressure can be proxied into four types, namely financial stability, leverage 
(level of debt), financial targets, and liquidity (Nugraha & Henny, 2015). Financial 
stability is measured by AGROW or asset growth, leverage by DR or debt ratio, 
financial target by ROA or return on assets, and liquidity by WCTA or working capital 
to total assets ratio (Persons, 1995). 
 
  
M = -4,840 + 0,920DSRI + 0,528GMI + 0,0404AQI + 0,892SGI + 0,115DEPI - 
0,172SGAI + 4,679TATA - 0,327LVGI 
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Table 2 Variable operationalization 
Variable Proxy Indicator Formula 












 Liquidity Working capital to total 




Opportunity Affectivity of supervision Commissioners 
independence IND = 
number of independent commissioners
number of 	board of commissioners
 
 Transaction to special 
parties 




Rationalization Auditor changes Dummy variable Not changing auditor = 0 
Changing auditor = 1 
Opportunity can be translated into two proxies, namely the effectiveness of supervision 
and transactions of special parties (Albrecht, Turnbull, Zhang & Skousen, 2010). 
Managers who intend to manipulate reporting are likely to reduce the independent 
commissioner headcount. Therefore, the effectiveness of supervision is measured by the 
ratio of independent commissioners to the number of Board of Commissioners in the 
company (IND). Another proxy is the transaction with special parties, measured by 
dividing total accounts receivable on the special parties to the company's total 
receivables. Special parties are groups that have the ability to control another business 
in making financial and operational decisions.  
Fraud is not only committed by employees, but also by people at the management level. 
To escape detection, management tends to change auditors frequently (DeFond, 1992). 
The relationship between management and auditors is management rationalization 
because auditor's observations have an effect on the risk and results of the audit, which 
raises concerns from management. In this study, the change in external auditors is 
proxied by Auditor Changes: if companies do auditor changes, then it is coded with “1” 
and companies that do not make auditor changes are coded as “0” (dummy variables). 
After divided into “with fraud” and “without fraud”, the samples are tested through the 
mean scores of all proxies. Finally, it is concluded whether companies with fraud get 
more pressure, opportunity, and rationalization compared to companies without fraud. 
Therefore, the hypotheses are: 
H1. Companies with detected fraud are financially more stable; 
H2. Companies with detected fraud are more leveraged; 
H3. Companies with detected fraud have a higher financial target; 
H4. Companies with detected fraud are more liquid; 
H5. Companies with detected fraud are less supervised; 
H6. Companies with detected fraud have more transactions with special parties; and 
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4. Research Results and Discussion 
Table 3 provides the calculation of the Beneish’s M-score with its eight variables based 
on the financial information from the period 2013-2015. If the M-score is higher than -
2.22, companies are detected committing fraud. After applying this rule, we found that 
190 companies are assumed not committing fraud in the financial statements. It means 
that around 30 per cent of the samples is manipulating their statements.  
 























1.15 3.02 1.75 
1.9
0 1.62 3.96 -1.17 1.82 -7.01 No fraud 190 
3.67 1.88 3.40 
4.5
5 5.34 3.72 0.66 1.62 6.26 Fraud 80 
 
To link the result of the Beneish model, the average scores of fraud triangle components 
are calculated for each group of companies: with fraud and without fraud, as shown in 
Table 3. The Beneish’s M-score functions as the separator for the samples.  
 







Pressure Financial stability AGROW 0.074 0.128 
 Leverage DR 0.501 0.703 
 Financial target ROA 0.044 0.068 
 Liquidity WCTA 0.222 0.174 
Opportunity Supervision affectivity IND 0.372 0.341 
 Special transaction SPREC 0.135 0.275 
Rationalisation Auditor changes AC 0.094 0.166 
 
Table 4 shows the mean value of indicators to measure pressure, opportunity, and 
rationalisation for both companies with and without fraud. It is shown that the 
companies with fraud receive more pressure on financial stability (AGROW = 0.128), 
level of debt (DR = 0.703), and financial target (ROA = 0.068) compared to companies 
without detected fraud which receive less pressure on financial stability (AGROW = 
0.074, level of debt (DR = 0.501), and financial target (ROA = 0.044). It is contrary to 
the finding of Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan (2011), which found that return on assets 
is lower in companies with fraud. However, it is concluded H1, H2, and H3 are 
accepted, but H4 must be rejected. 
 
Companies with detected fraud are less supervised by of independent commissioners 
(IND = 0.341) and have more transaction with special parties (SPREC = 0.275) 
compared to companies without fraud that are more supervised by independent 
commissioners (IND = 0.372) and have less special transactions (SPREC = 0.135).  
This reflects that management from companies with detected fraud tried to limit the 
numbers of independent commissioners to prevent detection of fraud. These companies 
also had more transactions with organizations that have a special relationship with the 
company. It is easier to plan a crime with these special organizations. Therefore, H5 and 
H6 are accepted. 
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Fraud companies also change external auditors more often (AC = 0.166) compared to 
companies without detected fraud (AC = 0.094). External auditors are public auditors 
that have no relationship and no interest in a business, so the professional judgment 
(audit opinion) is based on the real findings during the audit process. Being audited 
from different auditors every year enables managements to hide proofs. 
 
Table 5 Hypothesis checking result 
No Hypothesis Conclusion 
H1 Companies with detected fraud are financially more stable. Accepted 
H2 Companies with detected fraud are more leveraged. Accepted 
H3 Companies with detected fraud have a higher financial target. Accepted 
H4 Companies with detected fraud are more liquid. Rejected 
H5 Companies with detected fraud are less supervised. Accepted 
H6 Companies with detected fraud have more transactions with special parties. Accepted  
H7 Companies with detected fraud change external auditor more often. Accepted 
 
5. Conclusions, Implications, and Limitations 
5.1 Conclusions 
This empirical study is to check the applicability of the fraud triangle model by 
matching the concept with the Beneish model. The results show that companies with 
fraud receive more pressure on financial stability, leverage, and financial target, bigger 
opportunity due to the less independent commissioner and more transactions with 
special parties, as well as more rationalization showed by changing auditors more often 




This study has implications for prospective investors and stakeholders to be able to 
understand the components that might cause fraudulent actions in financial reporting. 
Therefore, they can better detect fraud and improve decision making. For scientific 
implications, this research can be used as a reference to develop future research in the 




Future researchers might extend the fraud model to add social factors that can motivate 
fraudulence. Cieslewicz (2012) and Mui and Mailley (2015) mentions some societal 
factors such as philosophical and religious tradition, culture, social norms, 
socioeconomic conditions and political status. Future studies can also examine the 
significance of the difference in the fraud triangle components between companies with 
fraud and companies without fraud.  
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